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a b s t r a c t
We attempt to explore the development of a financial crisis mathematically, constructing
and analysing a simple qualitative mathematical model of a progressing crisis. This model
brings an insight into the evolution of a crisis and enables us to evaluate the likely
outcomes of the possible interventions that can slow the crisis’ progress or ameliorate its
consequences. The model also helps to identify the factors and actions that may enhance
the global economic security.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper we attempt to mathematically explore the development of the ongoing financial crisis. The financial crisis
began in July 2007when a loss of confidence in the value of securitizedmortgages in the United States resulted in a liquidity
crisis [1,2]. In September 2008, the crisis became visible, as stock markets worldwide crashed and entered a period of
high volatility, and a considerable number of banks, mortgage lenders and insurance companies failed in the following
weeks. Beginning with failures of large financial institutions in the United States, it rapidly evolved into a global credit
crisis, accompanied by deflation [3], resulting in a number of prominent American and European bank failures and declines
in various stock indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities [4] and commodities worldwide [5]. These
events show that our economical prosperity is insecure and that the global economy is a very sensitive system that can
break down on a global scale due to a disproportionately small factor. This also leads to the question: what can be done to
avoid or prevent such events in the future, or at least to reduce their consequences.
In this note we attempt to address these issues, constructing a mathematical model of a financial crisis. In contrast to
verbal theories, mathematical modelling, as a tool for exploring natural- and human-created phenomena, gives a precise
and explicit connection between a set of assumptions and conclusions. A goodmathematical model starts with the smallest
possible number of essential assumptions and follows the implications rigorously to their logical conclusions. Thus, a simple
and elegant model often has greater intrinsic value than an accurate one that is overloaded with detail; in this aspect
mathematical modelling is akin to Ockham’s razor.
2. Model
We consider an economy as a ‘‘population’’ of interacting economic agents (thereafter also referred to as players, or
units) of size N . These units may be viewed as participants of the economy, even if they are mere home borrowers or small-
scale investors. We divide the population into two subpopulations, namely the ‘‘healthy’’ subpopulation of size x(t), and the
‘‘activated’’ subpopulation of size y(t). The members of the second group have financial difficulties or are unable to fulfil
their financial obligations. We assume that, apart from belonging to one of these two classes, all the units are the same, and
that the population is homogeneous. This assumptionmay appear too loose for a real economy, where the agents are of very
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different (financial) value. However, in the frames of this model a large financial institution or company can be viewed as
a cluster of the basic units; then the financial circumstances of this institution may be described by the ratio of its healthy
and activated components.
We assume that there is no influx of new participants into the system. That is equivalent to the assumption that the
time scale of a crisis is considerably shorter than the time scale of the steady economical growth. Furthermore, we assume
that the activated units can activate the healthy units, with which they are in business relationship, by failing to fulfil their
financial obligations. We assume that to be activated, an average healthy unit has to come into contact with α activated
units. Then, considering the process of activating as a chemical reaction x + αy → (1 + α)y, we can conclude that the
activation occurs at the rate βxyα (cf. [6]), where β is a positive activation rate coefficient.
After activation, the unit stays activated and can pass the active state further to healthy units. The activated state lasts
for σ time units on average, and then the unit is removed from the population and does not participate in further events.
Then, assuming that the active state can be transmitted to the susceptible unit at the rate β , the dynamics of the system can
be described by the following differential equations:
x˙ = −βxyα,
y˙ = βxyα − 1
σ
y. (1)
The behaviour of this model is defined by the initial conditions and by three parameters, namely α, β and σ . For a real
economy the parameter α, that is an average number of the activated units that are required for activating a healthy unit,
must be larger than 1 because, as will be shown later, no economy with α ≤ 1 can sustain. We view the parameter α as a
mean value for a large population, and hence its value is not an integer but rather is a real number. For a modern economy
1 < α < 10, while for themajority of participants 1 < α < 2. The parameter α is in our control and can be enlarged (e.g. via
diversification of investment or supply). The activation rate coefficient β reflects efficiency of an economy: it is proportional
to the speed of propagation of information and to the rate of working capital turnover. Estimating this parameter is themost
difficult task, as the data for a real crisis are necessary. The parameter σ is an average time during which an activated unit
is affecting the others. For a modern economy, σ ranges from a week to a few weeks.
3. Properties of the model
We consider the dynamics of this model in the phase space: every point of the non-negative quadrant of the xy plane
corresponds with a state of the economy with x healthy and y activated units (see Fig. 1). It is readily seen that x˙(t) < 0 for
all x, y > 0, and that x˙(t) = 0 when x = 0 or y = 0. That is, the number of the healthy units decreases in the presence of
the activated units, and remains constant in the absence of these. The health of economy is reflected by the dynamics of the
activated units y(t). It is easy to see that y˙ = 0 holds on the curve Γ where
βxyα − 1
σ
y = 0.
This curve is shown by the dashed line in Fig. 1. The curve divides the positive quadrant of the xy plane into two regions,
which are denoted by A and B in Fig. 1. In the region A, y˙(t) > 0 holds, and hence the activated subpopulation steadily grows.
This growth continues until eventually a phase trajectory leaves the region A crossing the curve Γ and entering the region B.
In the region B, y˙(t) < 0, and hence the activated subpopulation decreases to zero (Fig. 1).
It is noteworthy that this behaviour is similar to an epidemic of an infectious disease [7] with themajor difference that in
the case of epidemics usually α = 1 [8]. Nevertheless, this resemblance allows us to view a financial crisis as an epidemic of
bankruptcies. This observation links thismodel in some aspects to the idea of ‘‘financial contagion’’, with themajor difference
between them that the financial contagion usually implies ‘‘the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country spillover effects’’, or increase of cross-country correlations [9–19], whereas in our model we are concerned with
the relationship of basic agents of an economy assuming that failure of a unit occurs due to failure of its partners to fulfil
obligations.
If an economy is initially positioned in the region B, then no rise of the number of the activated players occurs, and the
system tends to the state with y = 0, where it remains. A crisis of bankruptcies starts only when the system gets into
the region A, whereas a healthy economy is positioned in B and may remain there indefinitely. However, if in the xy plane
an economy is positioned sufficiently close to the curve Γ , then a stochastic fluctuation can send the system across the
boundary Γ into the region A initiating a cascade of financial failures. That is, to prevent a crisis it suffices to keep the
system reasonably far from the boundary Γ . The problem is, however, that the boundary Γ tends to the x axis as x grows, as
can be seen in Fig. 1. This implies that for a given set of parameters α, β and σ and for any given magnitude of fluctuation
there is a population size x(0) such that the fluctuation of this given magnitude will certainly bring the system across the
boundary Γ into the crisis region A.
Indeed, the curve Γ is given by the equation
y = 1/(σβx) 1α−1 . (2)
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Fig. 1. Schematic phase portrait of the system (1). Here, A is the crisis region, B is the stable economy region, and Γ is the boundary between the two
regions.
Assuming that the initial position of the economy is on or near the x axis (that is initially y(0) = 0 or very small), we
obtain that a fluctuation of a given magnitude ∆y certainly shifts an economy of size x(0), that is larger than a critical size
xcr =
(
σβ∆yα−1
)−1, into the crisis region. This also implies that if the values of α, β and σ do not depend on the economy
size, then a larger economy is more vulnerable. Fig. 1 also gives a general idea what can be done to avoid a crisis. It is easy
to see that the higher and further to the right the curve Γ is in the xy plane the safer the economy is. That is, to reduce the
likelihood and the consequence of a crisis, it is advisable to take measures that shift the curve Γ higher and to the right in
the xy plane. However, that may be a rather difficult and expensive task.
The properties of this model is defined by the initial conditions and by three parameters, namely α, β and σ , where the
parameters β and σ are coming as a product, ρ = σβ . For a given value of x (given the economy size), the larger the value of
ρ = σβ is, the lower the curve Γ is placed. As we mentioned earlier, β reflects efficiency of an economy: it is proportional
to the speed of propagation of information and to the rate of working capital turnover. Therefore, artificial reduction of this
rate is meaningless and hardly possible.
The parameterα is an average number of the activated contacts (the failed partners) that are required to activate a healthy
unit. It may be anticipated that the higher the value of α is, the larger the safety margins are. Eq. (2) confirms this deduction.
An increase in α can be achieved, for instance, by diversification of investment and supply. However, while the increasing α
by all means is advisable, we have to note that increasing the safety margins by increasing α leads to a limited success and
may be costly. Fig. 2 shows the safety margin as a function of α for a range of values of D = βσ x = ρx. It is readily seen that
for smaller α the increment of α leads to a remarkable improvement of safety. However, it is obvious from this picture that
the safety margin has an upper limit (y = 1 in Fig. 2) which does not depends on α; when this limit is approached a further
increase of α gives only negligible increase of the safety margin. For the larger values of D (that is for the larger population
sizes) the possibility to improve the safety is preserved for larger α. However the general tendency that a large increase can
be reached for only comparatively low α holds here as well. Taking into consideration that increasing α beyond some level
can be costly, and that the cost growswith α faster than linearly, we come to the conclusion that improving economic safety
by mean of increasing α has its limitation and may be a costly option.
Fig. 3 shows why an economy with α ≤ 1 cannot exist. It is obvious from Fig. 3 that in the case α < 1 the curve Γ is a
parabola of degree 1/(1− α) > 1, and hence there is no safety margin at all. In this case for any economy size the slightest
perturbation causes a crisis. Moreover, it can be seen from Fig. 3 that in this case all the healthy units will be destroyed by a
crisis as the population that survive though the crisis in this case is zero. In the case α = 1 there also is no safety margin for
an economy of size larger than ρ = βσ , and for such an economy a crisis starts at a slightest perturbation. It is obvious that
in any case an economywith α ≤ 1 is unsustainable. For a modern economy 1 < α < 10; however the author believes that
in the most cases 1 < α < 2. Therefore, there is a fair possibility for increasing personal and collective economic safety via
diversification of investment or supply.
The parameter σ , that is an average time during which an activated unit is affecting the others, can be the primary
means of controlling a crisis: an intervention aimed to reduce this time can slow down the crisis and considerably reduce
its consequence. Indeed,
x = 1
βσ
y1−α,
A. Korobeinikov / Applied Mathematics Letters 22 (2009) 1882–1886 1885
Fig. 2. Safety margin as a function of the parameter α for D = βσ x = ρx ranging from 10 to 107 .
Fig. 3. Curves Γ for α > 1, α = 1 and α < 1, respectively.
and hence decreasing σ is equivalent to the proportionate shifting of the curve Γ to the right. Decreasing σ means that the
activated units have to be removed from the system as quickly as possible, and ideally before they actually cause damage to
the others. Assuming that the cost of such removal does not depends on the moment of the removal, the most cost effective
action is to remove an activated unit immediately after activation and before it causes any further damage. The problem is,
however, that the cost of such intervention can be very high. An obvious action that decreases σ is bailing out the hopeless
debts [20], and it is obvious that this involved very large expenses. A specific study is needed for every particular case.
However, it appears that in the frame of this model an intervention aimed at the reduction of σ is the only option that
is available after a crisis has begun. This also indicates that whatever action is chosen it should be swift: to minimize the
further damage, a decision to remove the activated players and the action itself should be carried out as quickly as possible.
There is a factor that we have to mention since this particular factor can considerably decrease the safety margin and at
the same time moves the economy in xy plane closer to the unsafe boundary. This factor is fraud. A fraudulent company is
essentially a parasite that is able to affects (activate) other units while preserving its own activity for longer. In the frame
of this model, a fraudulent unit should be classified into the y class, with the difference from the other units of this class in
that a fraudulent company belongs to this class from the very beginning of its existence, whereas the rest of the y class units
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are the consequence of shifting from the x class to the y class as a result of sincere failure or of activation via a contact with
y class units. That is, the presence of the malicious units gives a non-zero initial condition for y(t) and places an economy
above the x axis. Furthermore, the intention of a fraudulent company is to prolong its existence as long as possible (ideally
indefinitely) and to attack as many of other participants as possible. Therefore, for a malicious unit the values of β and σ
are considerably larger than these for an average unit. This increases the average values of β and σ of the whole system
shifting the curve Γ down in xy plane and hence reducing the safety margin and making the economy more vulnerable.
That is, the presence of the malicious units has a dual effect: it moves up the position of the economy on the xy plane, and at
the same time it lowers the position of the curve Γ reducing the safety margin. This consideration indicates how dangerous
fraudulent companies can be in reality, and how important detecting and removing them in time is.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion the authorwould like to note that of course thismodel is a great oversimplification and lacksmany features
of a real economy. However, it must be kept in consideration that the complexity of a real economy is such that constructing
a model of reasonable accuracy, which can be used for quantitative prediction, is a task of tremendous difficulty. A real
economy is a tremendously complex system that depends on a very large number of parameters and can be influenced by a
vast variety of factors. Many of these factors and parameters are unknown or even in principal unmeasurable. Furthermore,
as it may be a priori assumed or concluded from observing the ongoing crisis, and it was shown in this note, a crisis is an
unstable process. One hardly can expect that a precise or reasonably accurate quantitative description for such a process is
possible at all.
Under such circumstances, constructing and exploiting a simple conceptualmodel that is aimed at qualitative description
rather than at obtaining precise quantitative predictions, iswell justified. The author’s aimwas to construct such a qualitative
model that can give an insight into the developments and the outcomes of financial crises. The author’s immediate task was
to show that such modelling is, in principal, possible and to indicate an avenue for this modelling, and also to select the
factors that are of principal importance and affect the dynamics most.
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